Plaintiff entertainer sued defendant attorney for civil extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful interference with economic advantage. The trial court denied the attorney’s motion to strike the complaint pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16. The California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The attorney petitioned for review. A class action lawyer representing a litigant file notice of appearance during trial.
Table of Contents
Overview
The entertainer’s action against the attorney was based on a demand letter the attorney sent to the entertainer on behalf of a client who claimed that the entertainer had raped her and on subsequent telephone calls the attorney made to the entertainer’s attorneys, demanding a seven-figure payment to settle the client’s claims against the entertainer. The court concluded that the attorney’s communications constituted criminal extortion as a matter of law and, as such, were unprotected by constitutional guarantees of free speech or petition. At the core of the attorney’s letter were threats to publicly accuse the entertainer of rape and to report and publicly accuse him of other unspecified violations of various laws unless he settled by paying a sum of money to the client of which the attorney would receive 40 percent. That the threats were half-couched in legalese did not disguise their essential character as extortion. Because the activity forming the basis of the attorney’s motion to strike was extortion as a matter of law and, therefore, not constitutionally protected activity for purposes of § 425.16, the motion to strike was properly denied.
Outcome
The appellate court’s judgment was affirmed.
Procedural Posture
Defendant former employees appealed an order of the Court of Appeal of California, Sixth Appellate District, dismissing the appeal of the denial of their motions to strike the complaint of plaintiffs, employers and a coworker, as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16. The trial court found defendants liable for libel, invasion of privacy (appropriation of name), breach of contract, and conspiracy.
Overview
The employers fired one of the employees for harassing coworkers including plaintiff coworker. The other employee resigned in sympathy. The employees posted numerous derogatory messages about plaintiffs on the Internet. The court held that an appeal from the denial of a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute effected an automatic stay of the trial court proceedings under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 916(a). Because granting a motion to strike under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 resulted in the dismissal of a cause of action on the merits, an appellate reversal of an order denying such a motion could similarly result in a dismissal. Such an appellate outcome was irreconcilable with a judgment for the plaintiff on that cause of action following a proceeding on the merits. Moreover, such a proceeding was inherently inconsistent with the appeal because the appeal sought to avoid that very proceeding. The employees’ anti-SLAPP motions encompassed all of plaintiffs’ causes of action. As such, all of the matters on trial were embraced in and affected by the employees’ appeal from the denial of that motion, and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these matters.
Outcome
The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal with instructions to remand the case for a new trial.
